Abstract: In this paper we formulate a dynamic model of a profit maximization problem for assessing quantitatively how the policy of carbon tax and emissions trading would be effective to achieve the targeted reduction of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, we evaluate the influence of carbon tax and emissions trading on the economy in industry in a long-term view.
INTRODUCTION
The Kyoto Protocol is an agreement made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2003) . Countries that ratify this protocol commit to reduce their emissions of CO 2 and five other greenhouse gases (GHG), or engage in emissions trading if they maintain or increase emissions of these gases (Hertel, ed., 1993). Governments are separated into two general categories: developed countries, referred to as Annex 1 countries (who have accepted GHG emission reduction obligations and must submit an annual greenhouse gas inventory); and developing countries, referred to as Non-Annex 1 countries (who have no GHG emission reduction obligations but may participate in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)).
The treaty was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997, and the agreement came into force on February 16, 2005 following ratification by Russia on November 18, 2004. As of December 2006, a total of 169 countries and other governmental entities have ratified the agreement (representing over 61.6% of emissions from Annex 1 countries). Notable exceptions include the United States and Australia. Other countries, like India and China, which have ratified the protocol, are not required to reduce carbon emissions under the present agreement despite their relatively large populations.
By 2008-2012, Annex 1 countries have to reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5% below their 1990 levels (for many countries, such as the EU member states, this corresponds to some 15% below their expected GHG emissions in 2008). While the average emissions reduction is 5%, national targets range from 8% reductions for the European Union to a 10% emissions increase for Iceland. Reduction targets expire in 2013 (Wikipedia, 2007) .
Japanese government is conservative to introduce carbon tax, emissions trading between various industries in Japan and also between countries in the world, to feedback the carbon tax revenue for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. This is because the industrial circles in Japan are opposing against these policies for fear that the economic competitiveness is decreasing.
In this paper, we consider the carbon tax and the emissions trading among 5 developed countries and Russia as an emissions permit supplier in order to meet the CO 2 emissions reduction target, and evaluate the economic influence on the industry in each country.
MODELING FOR POLICY ASSESSMENT
We construct a dynamic version of the mathematical model described in Akazawa, et al. (2002) . The objective countries are Japan, United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany as shown in the model summarized in Fig. 1 . In Fig. 1 solid line between two countries shows the existence of commodities trade, and the dotted lines show emissions trading. Russia is added as an emissions permits supplier in the emissions trading. The industry of these countries is classified into 10 sectors as shown in Table 1 . This model consists of a profit maximization problem and sub-problems. The former problem is based on the dynamic input-output analysis (Leontief, 1970; Tamura, et al., 2001) and expresses the profit maximization behavior of each country, which introduces the carbon tax and the emissions trading to meet the emissions reduction target. The latter problems express domestic transaction, international trades, and the CO 2 cost, which describes the cost to reduce CO 2 and the cost for paying carbon tax. 
where, d i denotes the domestic final demand of sector i, ε i denotes a price elasticity of the domestic output of sector i, and p i denotes a price of the domestic demand of sector i.
In this paper, the export competition is supposed as Cournot competition, so export is determined as follows:
where p i a denotes an import demand function of sector i, w i denotes an export of sector i, a denotes a constant term of an import demand function, b denotes a coefficient of an import function, and w i a denotes a sum of export of sector i in the rest of the countries.
Fig. 2
shows CO 2 marginal reduction cost with respect to CO 2 reduction rate. In general, the more energy efficiency is improved, the more marginal reduction cost of CO 2 emissions is increased (Energy Information Administration, 2003). In Fig. 2 t 0 denotes the CO 2 marginal reduction cost at the present time. If the carbon tax rate of t 1 was imposed, each economic unit would reduce CO 2 up to the reduction rate of s 1 . At this point CO 2 marginal reduction cost would be equal to the carbon tax rate, since each economic unit would minimize the CO 2 cost that is composed of the cost for reducing CO 2 and the cost for carbon tax. Seoul, Korea, July 6-11, 2008 Hence, the total CO 2 cost is described as
where t denotes carbon tax, s i,t denotes CO 2 reduction rate in the i-th sector at time t, f(*) denotes CO 2 reduction cost function, r i denotes CO 2 emission coefficient in the i-th sector and T t denotes CO 2 emission target at time t. The first term of eqn.(4a) shows the cost for reducing CO 2 emission and the second term shows the carbon tax to be paid.
Eqn.(4b) shows the constraint to meet that the amount of CO 2 emission must be less than or equal to the emission target T t .
In the case that the revenue of the carbon tax is assigned to the general funds, only a part of the revenue can be used for the investment of the CO 2 reduction behavior or the purchase of the CO 2 emissions permit. But in the case that the revenue of the carbon tax is assigned to the earmarked funds, all of the revenue can be used for the investment of the CO 2 reduction behavior or the purchase of the CO 2 emissions permit. As shown in Fig.3 , in the case that all revenue is assigned to the investment of the CO 2 reduction behavior, the CO 2 reduction rate is improved to the level, s 2 , where, s 2 is the level that the area enclosed by S 1 , S 2 and marginal cost curve is equal to the area enclosed by S 2 , '1' and t 1 . In Fig. 3 t 2 denotes the subsidy for marginal reduction of CO 2 emission. In this case, the private expense is the sum of the cost for CO 2 reduction and the carbon tax shown in Fig. 3 . This expense is much less than that in Fig.  2 . Quantitative comparison will be discussed later. Kyoto Protocol regulates the reduction target on the sum of emissions between 2008 to 2012, hence, we evaluate the averaged value of these period. The data of the input-output matrix and price elasticity, etc, used in this paper are taken from Akazawa, et al. (2002) .
THE PREDICTION FOR 2008 TO 2012
Looking at the transition of CO 2 emissions from 1990, it increased in U.S., Japan and France, almost 17%, 11% and 2%, respectively, in 2000. In Russia, it decreased 37% in 1996, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the economic confusion after that. In Germany and U.K., it decreased 15% and 7%, respectively, in 2000 according to the data of UNFCCC (2003).
According to the prediction of the Energy Information Administration (2003) for the transition of CO 2 emissions from 1990 to 2010, it will increase 33.1%, 24.2% and 5.9% in U.S., Japan and France, respectively, and it will decrease 20.4%, 14.4% and 0.6% in Russia, Germany and U.K., respectively.
The prediction of the CO 2 emissions in 2010, which represent the averaged emissions between 2008 and 2012, is shown in and ASEAN International Input-Output Table ( 1990) . It is assumed that carbon tax is imposed on the consumption of coals, natural gas and oil products. It is assumed that CO 2 emissions coefficients in Japan, that is, the amount of CO 2 emissions per unit production in each sector is estimated from the basic unit of CO 2 emissions based on Basic Unit of CO 2 emissions Based on the Input-Output Table ( 1997) . CO 2 emissions coefficients in other countries are estimated from Japanese emissions coefficients and the amount of consumption of coals, natural gas and oil products in each country. Table 3 shows CO 2 emissions coefficients in each country for each sector. (ton carbon/unit production)
SCENARIO SETTING
As shown in Table 2 , Japan, U.S. and EU countries must take additional policies to achieve the reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol. We will consider carbon tax and emissions trading as the national policy. To evaluate the influence on the revenue, the price of emissions trading, and the amount of carbon dioxide emissions, etc., we postulate three scenarios as follows:
< Scenario I > Each country reduces its emissions by the carbon tax, without the emissions trading. < Scenario II > Each country reduces its emissions by the carbon tax and the emissions trading among Japan, EU and Russia. < Scenario III > Each country reduces its emissions by the carbon tax and the emissions trading among Japan, EU, Russia and U.S.
In these Scenarios, the reduction target of U.S. is assumed to be 18% reduction of emissions per unit GDP, during 2002 and 2012 in Scenarios I and II, and the value of Kyoto protocol in Scenario III.
POLICY ASSESSMENT
We will compare two cases that the revenue of the carbon tax is assigned to the general funds and to the earmarked funds. For comparison, the ratio of investment to the CO 2 reduction behavior is assumed to be zero in the general funds case. ($/ton carbon) Table 4 shows the necessary carbon tax to achieve the emissions reduction target of each country for each scenario. We can find that the carbon tax is reduced to one fourth or fifth in the earmarked funds case compared with the general funds case. We also find that the more the range of emissions trading expands, the more the carbon tax is getting lower.
For the general funds case in Table 4 (a), if we use only carbon tax to reduce CO 2 emissions, that is, in Scenario I carbon tax rate would become more than 200 dollars/ton carbon in Japan. This is because the energy technology for saving energy has been improved drastically in the Japanese industries since the time of oil crisis. The reason why the carbon tax rate in France in Scenario I is high, is that nuclear power plants are widely used for electric power 17th IFAC World Congress (IFAC'08) Seoul, Korea, July 6-11, 2008 generation. If we use emissions trading in addition to the carbon tax, carbon tax rate is reduced to somewhere around 100 dollars/ton carbon as shown in Scenario II in Table 4 (a). If we expand the number of countries to join the emissions trading, the carbon tax rate could be further reduced.
For the earmarked funds case in Table 4 (b), carbon tax rate in Scenario III is higher than in Scenario II, except in France and in Germany. The reason for this result is that since the amount of CO 2 emissions in U.S. is huge, price for the emissions trading would be raised in Scenario III. The reason why the carbon tax rate in each scenario is identical in France and in Germany, is that carbon tax rate is lower than the price for the emissions trading in both countries.
If we compare the earmarked funds case with the general funds case in Japan, the necessary carbon tax rate is reduced to one fourth to one fifth. This shows that the subsidy for reducing CO 2 emissions is quite effective. 5 shows the transition of production output in each scenario for the general funds case and for the earmarked funds case. For the general funds case the production output is decreased about 1% in each scenario right after the taxation. Even after 10 years the level of the production output does not recover up to the level before the taxation. For the earmarked funds case production output is not affected so much by the taxation. Especially in Scenario II production output level grows after three years of taxation. For the general funds case the profit is decreased about 1.5 to 2% depending on the scenario right after the taxation. Even after 10 years the level of the profit does not recover up to the level before the taxation. For the earmarked funds case profit is not affected so much by the taxation just like in the case of production output. Fig. 7 shows the transition of the economic growth rate in each scenario for the general funds case and for the earmarked funds case. For the general funds case the economic growth rate is about -0.6 to -1% depending on the scenario right after the taxation. In Japan we have never experienced minus growth rate for more than four years. Therefore, bad influence of carbon tax to the economy is inevitable for the general funds case. For the earmarked funds case the economy is not affected by the carbon tax except the period of right after the taxation. Since Japanese industries have already improved the efficiency of consuming energy extensively, it is not rational to achieve the emissions reduction target with the carbon tax only. Joining the emissions trading, the undesirable influence on the profit would be reduced to half, and it would become more profitable by increasing the number of trading countries. Considering the application of the carbon tax, negative influence on the economy would be avoided by taking the earmarked funds policy.
The influence of the carbon tax is concentrated on the particular sectors, such as steel and chemistry industries (Sectors 3 and 4). We need some special considerations to such heavily energy consuming sectors to avoid a big influence of carbon tax.
We need further analysis for the second commitment period including Non-Annex 1 countries for CO 2 emissions cooperating with Annex 1 countries (Rose, et al., 1998) .
